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THE APPLICABILITY OF MIRANDA WARNINGS
TO CIVIL TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
In the case of Hugo Romanelhi the tax court held that defendant's
admissions obtained during a custodial interrogation where no Miranda
warnings' had been given to the taxpayer were not to be excluded in a
civil fraud proceeding pursuant to § 6653(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.' Romanelli, a tavern operator, was being investi-
gated for wagering activity5 by special agents of the Internal Revenue
Service who had placed bets with him and then obtained a warrant to
search his tavern. After serving the warrant, the four agents ushered
the customers out of the tavern, locked the door, and began intensive
questioning without giving any Miranda warnings.' During the inter-
rogation Romanelli admitted he had failed to report income for fear of
alerting federal authorities to his gambling activities. These admissions
were subsequently used to substantiate the government's civil fraud
allegations, resulting in Romanelli's liability for underpayment of tax
plus an additional 50 per cent assessment of that amount.
Romanelli's objection that the admissions should be suppressed as
violative of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
rejected. The court, in overruling the motion to suppress, reasoned that
1. Hugo Romanelli, 1970 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 54.138 (July 10, 1970), appeal
docketed, No. 18751, 7th Cir. Aug. 11, 1970. [Hereinafter cited as Romanelli.]
2. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court summarized these
warnings by stating at 478-79, "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
4. A civil fraud proceeding is an action by the government to impose a 50 per cent
penalty upon the amount of the underpayment of tax owed pursuant to ITT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 6653 (b) :
(b) Fraud-If any part of any underpayment... of tax required to be shown on a
return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 50 per cent of
the underpayment. In the case of income taxes and gift taxes, this amount shall be in
lieu of any amount determined under subsection (a).
5. Romanelli was being investigated for violations of IxT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§
4412 and 4905.
6. The Tax Court admitted it could see no subtsantial factual distinction between
this interrogation .and that in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), where the Supreme
Court held that interrogation in a man's bedroom by five law enforcement officers was
custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Romanelli court allowed these admissions, notwithstanding custody, because the
ultimate result was merely civil fraud. Romtanelli, at 1039.
7. Romanelli, at 1040.
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the privilege against self-incrimination is generally not applicable in civil
actions, and therefore held admissions during custodial interrogation
absent Miranda warnings are not excludable in a civil tax fraud pro-
ceeding.8 The dissent focused upon the possibility that by virtue of the
majority's holding the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be easily
circumscribed:
Under the decision of the majority, the taxpayer in this case
could have been locked in the freezer until he admitted that he
owed taxes to the government, and his admission used in
evidence against him before this court.'
The IRS procedures instituted in 1967 requiring Miranda warnings
to be given by all special agents would appear to alleviate the Romanelli
problem.'" There is no guarantee, however, that these procedures will
always be strictly followed or that a desirable result will obtain when
abuses occur." It is contended that Miranda warnings should be required
in situations similar to Romanelli but justified on broader grounds. There
are two basic arguments which lead to the conclusion that Miranda
warnings should be required in custodial interrogation involving tax
fraud investigations regardless of whether the ultimate penalty is civil or
criminal. First, a civil fraud sanction is functionally a criminal penalty
for self-incrimination purposes and is, therefore within the protection
accorded by the fifth amendment. Second, since investigatory procedures
of the Intelligence Division of the IRS are inequitable in practice,
evidence obtained from a taxpayer in a custodial setting where he has not
been advised of his rights should be excluded in civil fraud proceedings
to ensure administrative fairness.
While fifth amendment safeguards are required in cases that are
clearly criminal, their use is not compelled in those cases which are civil
in nature. However, limiting the classification of cases for the purpose
of the privilege against self-incrimination to either criminal or civil is an
oversimplification, since some cases present elements of both. Although
8. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained from tax fraud suspects custodially questioned by Internal Revenue
agents without prior Miranda warnings is excludable as evidence in criminal tax
fraud trials.
9. Romanelli, at 1042 (Quealy, J., dissenting).
10. Int. Rev. Service News Release IR., 949 Nov. 26, 1968, 7 CCH 1968 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. § 6946. The release requires that the special agent ". . . [I]s required to
identify himself, describe his function and advise the taxpayer that anything he says may
be used against him, . . . [and he must] .. .also tell the taxpayer that he cannot be
compelled to incriminate himself by answering questions or producing any documents
and that he has the right to seek the assistance of an attorney before responding."
11. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
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drawing rigid, arbitrary lines of demarcation between criminal and civil
sanctions arguably results in more predictability and consistency, when
the danger which the constitutional safeguard seeks to eradicate is present,
the basic rights of a suspect should not be compromised for the sake of
institutional expediency. Mere labeling of a proceeding as criminal or
civil should not necessarily be determinative of its real nature.
In rem forfeitures present an illustration of a proceeding involving
both civil and criminal elements. A landmark decision in the develop-
ment of the exclusionary rule was Boyd v. United States,2 where the
Supreme Court considered the rule's application to forfeiture proceedings.
In ordering the defendant to produce his private papers in a proceeding
to forfeit cases of glass imported in violation of customs duties, the Court
stated:
... [S]uits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the com-
mission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal
nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution and that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. ... "
Boyd is significant because it provided the basis for the traditional
classification of the in rem forfeiture proceeding as quasi-criminal.
The application of the exclusionary rule in forfeiture cases has
been premised primarily upon violations of the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, in
instances similar to Boyd, forfeiture proceedings have also been con-
sidered criminal for the purpose of the fifth amendment.' The situation
that would exist if there were no fourth or fifth amendment check on
12. 116 U.S. 626 (1886).
13. Id. at 634.
14. The issue of whether the fifth amendment privilege applies in forfeiture cases
has been resurrected in United States v. United States Coin and Currency in the Amount
of $8,674.00, 393 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3014 (1970).
The question before the court is whether Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1969),
and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1969), which prohibited criminal prosecutions
of individuals who properly assert their privilege against self-incrimination when
evidence of criminal activity has been uncovered as a result of their lawfully reporting
activities as required by the Internal Revenue Code reporting requirements, precludes
forfeiture of property in a proceeding under INT. Rnv. CoDE- of 1954, § 7302, requiring
forfeiture of property used in violation of other Internal Revenue laws. Held; Forfei-
ture of property used to violate federal gambling tax laws is barred by Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. United States Coin and Currency
in the Amount of $8,674.00. 39 U.S.L.W. 4415 (April 25, 1971).
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the investigative efforts of law enforcement officers in the quasi-criminal
area, was aptly set forth in United States v. Blank : 5
If there was no constitutional check on the investigative efforts
of Federal administrative officials prosecuting civil claims, and
there exists forfeiture and deficiency procedings civil in form,
which inflict an onerous monetary penalty upon an accused
which approximates the visitations of the criminal code, there
is no practical restraint upon such officials.16
The majority in Romanelli sought to distinguish these cases on the
theory that in rem forfeitures are an adjunct to criminal proceedings 7
because the property forfeited is utilized in furtherance of an underlying
criminal offense. It is arguable, however, that civil fraud is likewise an
adjunct to a criminal offense. Conviction of civil fraud requires virtually
the same elements as in criminal fraud."8 In both cases there must be an
underpayment of tax with intent to defraud the government 9 with only
the burden of proof and the penalties differing." In summary, just as
in rem forfeiture is an adjunct to a criminal action and therefore requires
the existence of an underlying criminal offense to merit constitutional
protection, civil fraud is likewise an adjunct to a criminal fraud action
and is merely a supplementary sanction to the underlying criminal
offense. 2 Civil fraud, like forfeiture, cannot be labeled purely civil:
15. 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966). Federal forfeiture proceeding where the
evidence had been illegally seized by federal administrative officials. Helds it must be
excluded from evidence as violative of the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable search and seizure.
16. Id. at 184.
17. In rem forfeitures were distinguished on this basis in John Harper, 54 T.C.
1121 (May 26, 1970), but the Rontnelli court, by resting its decision on the logic of
Harper, agreed with Harper's conclusions. Romanelli, at 1039.
18. The criminal counterpart to civil fraud is INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7201.
ATrEMPT TO EVADE OR DEFEAT TAX:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law ,be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.
19. Lipton, The Relationship Between the Civil and Criminal Penalties for Tax
Fraud, 1968 U. ILL. L. F. 527, 528, citing, Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499
(1943); R. SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL TAX FRAUD 6
(1963).
20. Lipton, supra note 19, at 528. The government's burden of proof in civil fraud
is clear and convincing evidence while the burden in criminal fraud is beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id.
21. Even assuming that forfeitures are an adjunct to a criminal offense because
the property involved is usually an instrumentality used in furtherance of the criminal
design, United States v. United States Coin and Currency in the Amount of $8,674.00,
393 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1968) held that forfeiture of property requires independent fifth
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both are connected with an underlying criminal offense and -both invoke
penalties which can be exacting.
Other factual analogies between civil fraud and criminal actions
suggest that civil fraud should not be classified as strictly civil for
purposes of constitutional protection. First, criminal misdemeanors are
entitled to all procedural safeguards, although their penalties are often
less onerous than the penalties resulting in civil fraud cases.22 Second,
suspects in civil fraud cases are investigated in the same manner as
criminal fraud suspects, since special agents cannot possibly be certain
at the time of interrogation whether the litigation will ultimately be
civil or criminal.2" Yet under Romanelli, the rights accorded to a suspect
depend upon the nature of the action ultimately brought against him.
Finally, any stigma of cheating attaching to the criminal action would
also attach to the civil action although the latter might not receive as
much notoriety. Civil fraud is analogous to many criminal actions, and
therefore distinguishing between them merely on the basis of the sanction's
nature is artificial and should only be considered as one of many factors.
The Romanelli majority relied primarily24 upon the authority of
Helvering v. Mitchell25 in reaching its conclusion that a civil tax fraud
defendant does not warrant fifth amendment protection. Mitchell had
been indicted under the criminal fraud statute,28 but after his acquittal
on that charge the government proceeded against him under the civil
fraud statute.27 Mitchell argued that the civil fraud action placed him in
double jeopardy on the theory that the civil sanction was also penal in
nature.28 The supporting argument was made that the civil fraud penalty
amendment protection, absent a further criminal prosecution. There could be no possi-
bility of a further criminal prosecution there because Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1969) held that evidence to convict a taxpayer of a crime must be excluded if
it was obtained through the taxpayer's compliance with the Internal Revenue Code
reporting provisions.
22. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-2301-03 (Burns 1956 Repl.), prohibiting
raffling, lotteries, or advertising for lotteries all resulting in penalties of $10.00 to
$500.00. The penalties in civil fraud can often be quite onerous; for example, in Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), Mitchell was subject to a civil fraud penalty
assessment of $364,354.92.
23. E. Mortenson & P. Mortenson, The Investigatory and Administrative Processes,
1968 U. ILL. L. F., 443, 445.
24. The Roinanelli majority also relied upon John Harper, 54 T.C. 1121 (May
26, 1970), a recent variation of the Mitchell theme, but the Harper case is distinguishable
on its facts, as there was no custodial interrogation.
25. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
26. At that time the criminal fraud statute which corresponded with INT. R,.. CoDE
of 1954, § 7201, was R VE E Acr OF 1928, § 146(a).
27. The corresponding 1928 civil fraud statute was REVENUE AcT OF 1928, § 293 (b).
28. U.S COxST. amend. V, " . . [N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb... "
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was meant primarily to suppress certain conduct rather than to supply
revenue, as indicated by the fact the addition was far out of proportion to
the ordinary tax.29 The Court in Mitchell found that the remedial char-
acter of the sanction made it a civil assessment rather than a criminal
penalty, while pointing to revenue protection, recoupment of heavy in-
vestigation expenses, and Congressional intent as the basis for its con-
clusion.3 By allowing Congressional intent to sweep all other con-
siderations aside, the Court's analysis begs the essential question of
whether a particular sanction is, for constitutional purposes, civil or
criminal.8 Under the Court's analysis, if Congress clearly states that a
sanction is to be remedial, a monetary penalty could be unlimited and
nevertheless be considered civil for all constitutional purposes.
It is proposed that the appropriate analysis of this issue should
follow the one advocated by Justice Frankfurter in United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess,2 to the effect that the focus should shift from the
nature of the sanction to the purpose of the particular constitutional
safeguard when a clear classification of either civil or criminal is difficult.
Frankfurter characterized the distinctions between civil-remedial and
criminal-penal sanctions as "dialectical subtleties" and proposed that
they are "too subtle when the problem is one of safeguarding the humane
29. Brief for Respondent, at 7, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); citing,
United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) ; Regal Drug v. Wardell, 260 U.S.
386 (1922) ; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557
(1922) ; Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903); Passavant v. United States, 148
U.S. 214 (1893) ; Wright v. Blakeslee, 101 U.S. 174 (1880) ; Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 263 (1853).
30. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-406 (1938). The Mitchell Court found
congressional intent that this was a civil sanction in the presence of two separate and
distinct provisions that appear in different parts of the statute and the heading of the
section reading "Additions to the Tax."
31. It must be conceded that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutory
provisions which provide for so-called civil sanctions in addition to criminal penalties
in situations analogous to civil fraud by relying primarily on the nature of the sanction.
See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909), where the Alien Immigration
Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, provided for a forfeiture of $1,000.00 by a violator up-
on suit by the United States for a violation of its provisions. Action by the United States
against a violator resulted in a directed verdict for the United States. The Su-
preme Court found that the statute was for a civil action to recover a penalty
rather than for a criminal proceeding and therefore a directed verdict did not violate
petitioner's sixth amendment right to a jury trial; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 148 (1956) involving double damages to the government for violations of the
Surplus Property Act of 1944, ch. 479, 58 Stat. 765. The Court held that the double
measure of recovery fixed by Congress was not so unreasonable and excessive as to
transform a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, and thus a second criminal prosecution
was not in violation of the double jeopardy clause; accord, United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), as to similar statutory double damage action subsequent
to a criminal prosecution.
32. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hers, 317 U.S. 537, 553 (1943), (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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interest for the protection of which the double jeopardy clause was
written into the Fifth Amendment."33 The constitutional protection
against self-incrimination, coupled with the exclusionary rule, is designed
to deter governmental coercion." Coercing self-incriminating statements
from taxpayers during custodial interrogations is just as reprehensible
whether used in a civil or criminal action. The best insurance against
coercive measures is a clear warning of a taxpayer's rights at the outset
of any custodial interrogation. The fifth amendment guarantee should
not be avoided merely by labeling the proceeding civil. 5
Although the fifth amendment privilege would seem limited by its
own terms to criminal cases, 6 it has been consistently held that the
privilege reaches to the possibility of criminal action, regardless of
whether one is actually brought.3 This right would apply to any dis-
33. 317 U.S. 537. 554 (1943).
34. B. GEORGE. CONSTITUTIONAL LmiTATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMIINAL CASES
93-114 (1969) ; 8 WIGmROaa, EVIDENCE, § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
35.' This issue was raised in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as follows:
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil
information against the claimant-that is civil in form-can he by this device
take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their
immunities as citizens and extort from them a production of their private papers,
or as an alternative a confession of their guilt? This cannot be. Id. at 634.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V, "... [N] or shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself:'
37. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14, 692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). Cited
in piccirillo v. New York, 39 U.S.L.W. 4162, 4166 (Jan. 25, 1971), (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). However, Donaldson v. United States, 39 U.S.L.W. 4139 (Jan. 25, 1971), casts
doubt upon the premise that the mere possibility of a criminal prosecution will sustain
an invocation of the privilege. Donaldson sought to intervene in an enforcement proceed-
ing to require his past employer to produce certain records and documents relating to
transactions with Donaldson. The court mentioned two instances where intervention is
appropriate: (1) Where material is sought for the improper use of obtaining evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution, or (2) where such materials are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The Court rejected Donaldson's contention that intervention in
enforcement proceedings of a summons is appropriate where the summons is utilized in
aid of an investigation which has the potentiality of resulting in a recommendation that
a criminal prosecution be instituted against the taxpayer. The court relied on cases which
found intervention appropriate only when a recommendation of criminal prosecution
existed or an indictment had been returned. That Donaldson might be indicted and pro-
secuted was only a possibility, and this, according to the Court, would not be sufficient
grounds for intervention. The Court could see no statutory suggestion for any meaningful
line of distinction for civil as compared with criminal purposes at the point of a special
agent's appearance. In rejecting any significance to the presence of a special agent, the
Court may be indicating a reluctance to follow United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111
(7th Cir. 1969), which held that the presence of a special agent shifts the investigation
from civil to criminal. In Romanelli, however, there was much more than the mere
possibility that he would be prosecuted. The search warrant from which the special
agents had authority to search Romanelli's tavern for gambling paraphernalia was issued
pursuant to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7302 which can only be issued in accordance with
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 which provides that a search warrant may only be issued on the
finding of probable cause that the property was stolen, embezzled, designed or intended
for use as a means of committing a criminal offense.
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closures that could be used in a criminal action,8" and can be claimed in
"any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial,
investigative or adjudicatory."39 Therefore, Romanelli had a right to
invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination at the time
of his interrogation since there was a strong probability that a criminal
action might obtain."0 This right, coupled with the inherent unfairness
of an IRS fraud investigation,41 should give rise to an obligation on
the part of special agents to advise all suspected taxpayers of their
privilege at the time of custodial interrogation. Omitting Miranda
warnings should taint any oral evidence obtained in the manner employed
by the IRS in Romanelli, even though it was ultimately used in a civil
fraud proceeding.
IRS procedure renders it unlikely that a pure civil fraud investiga-
tion is ever conducted.42 Once the Intelligence Division assigns a special
agent to determine whether fraud has been committed, his primary
objective is to acquire evidence for criminal prosecution.43 Since the
elements of civil and criminal fraud are identical," a taxpayer's own
admissions will be the primary source of evidence for either civil or
criminal fraud, and special agents will use the same methods to obtain
proof regardless of which action ultimately results.45
There is a growing number of cases which recognize a fairness
concept in administrative agency action that requires adherence to their
own procedural rules.46 In United States v. Heffner"7 an administra-
38. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 363 (1917) ; Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
39. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'rs. 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964), (White, J., con-
curring).
40. See note 37 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 57-65 infra.
42. IRS News Release IR., 897 Oct. 3, 1967, 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
§ 6832. Investigation of suspected criminal tax fraud is conducted by special agents of the
IRS Intelligence Division. When a taxpayer's return is checked by the Audit Division,
the purpose is simply to determine if the taxpayer has reported his correct tax liability,
and at the first indication of fraud the case is transferred to the Intelligence Division
for a determination of that issue.
43. Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions 1118.6, 35 Fed. Reg.
2454 (Feb. 1970). "Intelligence Division enforces the criminal statutes applicable to
income .... " See also, Andrews, Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under
Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage", 53 IowA L. RE . 1074, 1111 (1968).
44. See notes 19, 20 supra.
45. Boughner, Wilful Failure to File, 1968 U. ILL. L. F. 460, 468.
46. See Popkin, A Critique of the Rule-Making Process in, Federal Income Tax
Law %ith Special Reference to Conglomerate Acquisitions, 45 IND. LJ. 453, 501 (1970).
47. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). Heffner was a situation where the taxpayer had
willfully furnished to his employer fraudulent withholding statements. The criminal con-
viction was sustained in part by statements obtained from Heffner by special agents in a
non-custodial interrogation, and the court concluded that even though there had been no
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tive fairness rationale was applied where a special agent failed to follow
an IRS directive requiring Miranda warnings at the first contact."
In the ensuing criminal action, the court excluded the taxpayer's admis-
sions, holding that a government agency must scrupulously observe its
own rules and a failure to do so is a violation of due process.49 Romanelli's
dilemma arose prior to the issuance of the directive at issue in Heffner,
and it is therefore arguable that the problem in Romanelli no longer exists
if the Heffner rationale is applied to civil fraud cases." However, reliance
on Heffner may be tenuous. Several courts have already rejected the
Heffner rationale,51 and others may draw distinctions between civil and
criminal cases in an attempt to limit its application.
A broader application of administrative fairness appears to underlie
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in United States v.
Dickerson,2 where the issue was at what point in time must Miranda
warnings be given in a criminal tax fraud investigation. The court held
that warnings be given by special agents prior to actual custody,
specifically when the investigation's focus on the taxpayer turns from
civil to criminal."3 Implicit in the Dickerson holding is the concept of
fairness: the Miranda warnings were deemed a necessary response to the
inherent coercion in tax investigations and the methods used by special
agents to elicit information. The Heffner case also alludes to this broader
concept of fairness by recognizing that the purpose of the particular IRS
directive involved is both necessary and laudable."
custody the admissions were to be excluded; accord, United States v. Leahy, 8 Crim. L.
Rptr. 2038 (1st Cir. 1970).
48. 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. § 6832.
49. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) ; Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1959) ; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
50. The due process clause makes no distinction between civil and criminal actions.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V,"... [N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."
51. Two federal district court cases have not followed Heffifer. United States v.
Luna, 70-2 USTC 9498 (W.D. Tex. May 7, 1970), refused to follow Heffner, stating
that the cases Heffner relied on were distinguishable from a case involving the exclusion
of evidence. United States v. Middleton, 70-2 USTC 9498 (D. Minn. June 5, 1970),
found Heffner factually distinguishable, in that Heffnzer involved an uneducated and
emotionally disturbed individual, who was not instructed that he was a criminal suspect,
while Middleton involved a well-educated professional who at all times was aware that
criminal prosecution was a possibility.
52. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
53. Dickerson held that the warnings must be given when the investigation's focus
turns from civil to criminal, that is, when special agents enter the case. The majority
of circuits continue to rely on the pre-Miranda voluntariness test for non-custodial in-
terrogations. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied.
394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2nd Cir. 1968);
Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967) ; Schlinsky v. United States, 379
F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 (1967).
54. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1969). The court stated
369
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In other contexts, courts, after discovering inequities, have felt free
to analyze entire administrative systems with a view toward fairness. An
analogous use of this logic led to the Supreme Court's decision in In Re
Gault." After examining the juvenile offender system as a whole, the
Court concluded that the system was disfunctional and, as a result, was
inherently unfair. To remedy the unfairness of the system, juvenile
offenders were granted certain constitutional safeguards afforded to all
adults. A more recent illustration is Goldberg v. Kelly, 6 which con-
cerned state procedures for the termination of welfare payments. The
Court found that the entire termination process lacked fundamental fair-
ness and its holding imposed appropriate due process standards to
prevent further inequities.
Likewise, investigatory procedures used by the Intelligence Division
operate upon a suspected tax evader with sufficient unfairness that an
application of strict due process standards is required. First, at the time
of interrogation the taxpayer is often unaware that the investigation
is anything more than a routine audit." Although IRS regulations
require special agents to identify themselves," the term "special agent"
usually means nothing to the average taxpayer. 9 It follows that any tax
interrogation without Miranda warnings can be more treacherous than
custodial questioning of a suspect at the police station: the ordinary
suspect at least knows that his interrogators are seeking evidence to
that their holding would "assist the IRS in fulfilling its own important stated purpose
in requiring that the warnings be given." The purpose of the particular directive was
to ensure uniformity in the protection of constitutional rights of suspected taxpayers.
55. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault the Court, after reviewing the process of the
juvenile offender system, decided that the procedures were fundamentally unfair and that,
therefore, the juvenile needed the basic constitutional criminal safeguards. The significant
point is that once the court uncovered these specific problems they felt themselves free
to analyze the system beyond the specific problems at hand and to conclude on the basis
of the total system that the procedures were unfair. Id. at 1331.
56. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg the Court rejected the contention that the
procedural due process afforded an aggrieved welfare recipient should turn on the
rubric of whether the welfare assistance is a privilege or a right. The standard for due
process applicable to termination of welfare payments is assesed by the extent to which
the recipient may be condemned to suffer grievous loss. The extent of the loss must be
measured by balancing the government's interest which must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function involved. Id. at 262-63. Goldberg, like
Gault, followed the approach urged in this note, that is, they viewed the process as a
whole considering both the extent of the harm to the individual and the needs of the
government in utilizing their particular methods and from this they would ascertain the
standards of due process applicable.
57. Comment, Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel in Federal Income Tax
Investigations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1014, 1019-21 (1967).
58. INT. Rxv. SERvIcE News Release IR. 949 Nov. 26, 1968, 7 CCH 1968 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. § 6946.
59. Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of
a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 36 (1966).
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convict him of a crime, but the taxpayer is "permitted and even en-
couraged to believe that no criminal prosecution is in contemplation."6
Second, considerable pressure to cooperate arises from the well-founded
fear that non-cooperation may result in inquiries by special agents to
clients, customers, or other associates of the taxpayer which would be
harmful to his reputation.6 Moreover, the taxpayer may believe that
the government prosecutes only the recalcitrant.62 Third, the special
agent adds to these pressures because he is instructed to obtain admissions
before the taxpayer has had an opportunity to consider his dilemma68
or consult with counsel.64 The questions asked by a special agent will be
designed to elicit incriminating responses, 5 since the government will
usually prove its case with these statements.6
In practice a civil tax fraud investigation exists only as a concomit-
ance of the criminal fraud investigation. It is administratively unfair
to permit the IRS to use this dual investigatory procedure to its own
advantage by relying on evidence which would clearly be excludable in
a criminal action 7 to support a civil fraud suit.
Under the holding in Romanelli, evidence is admitted by focusing
upon the label attached to the ultimate cause of action and ignoring the
60. United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Ill. 1967), where in-
vestigation of taxpayer's business affairs by IRS shifted from civil investigation to
criminal without the taxpayer's knowledge, the district court held it was incumbent on
special agents to advise the taxpayer of his constitutional rights prior to non-custodial
interrogation.
61. See Duke, supra note 59, at 35.
62. Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323,
336 (1968).
63. The court in Dickerson v. United States, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969)
summed the problem up, stating:
It is the very fact that the taxpayer is not informed of the pendency of a criminal
investigation which aggravates the dilemma in which he finds himself. Unaware
of the possible consequences of his cooperation with the agent, he may never-
theless believe that he is obligated to supply the necessary information in order
to satisfy any possible tax deficiency which he may owe.
Id. at 1116.
64. See Lipton, supra note 62, at 337.
65. E. Mortenson & P. Mortenson, The Investigatory and Adizinistrative Processes,
1968 U. ILL. L. F. 443-44. An example of the results of such pressure can be found in
Hugo Romanelli TR. 69-70 where the testimony of Romanelli was as follows:
Q. And you were trying to be cooperative?
A. I was scared and ...
The Court: Mr. Romanelli, if they asked you a question and you knew the answer
was "no", do you mean to tell the Court that you were answering that yes?
A. I would have then, yes, sir.
The Court: In other words even if they asked you 'id you commit murder," you
would have said yes?
A. I would have said that at that time, yes sir.
66. See note 45 supra.
67. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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coercive aspects of the interrogation. The purpose behind the constitu-
tional protection against self-incrimination is thereby thwarted, and
doubt is cast upon the integrity of the judicial process which admits
such evidence in the face of administrative unfairness.
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